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Trade Regulation-1962 Tennessee Survey
Leo 1. Raskind*
I. LEGALITY OF CASH DISCOUNT IN LIEu OF TRADING STAMPS AS GOOD FAITH
MEETING OF COMPETITION UNDER THE DAIRY LAW
II. REFUSAL To TEST BY AN INDUSTRY TESTING LABORATORY AS A RESTRAINT OF
TRADE UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
III. PRICE FXNG UNDER SECTION 1-ATTEMPTS To MONOPOLIZE, COMBINATIONS
OR CONSPIRACIES To MONOPOLIZE, AND MONOPOLIZATION UNDER SECTION
2-DIscRMINATORY PRICING UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
I. LEGALITY OF CASH DISCOUNT IN LEu OF TRING STAmS
AS GOOD FArm MEETING OF COMPETrTION UNDER THE DAIRY LAw
In Hogue v. Kroger,1 a retail grocer sought a declaratory judgment,
under the Dairy Law of 1961, of his right to reduce the seding price
of his milk (ex-trading stamps) below the statutory price by the
amount of the cost of the trading stamps to a stamp-dispensing
competitor. The commissioner of agriculture opposed this practice.
Being responsible under the statute2 for enforcing compliance with
the statutory price, the commissioner answered, coupling with his
answer a cross-bill seeking to enjoin further sales by Hogue at the
reduced cash price. The supreme court affirmed a denial of the
commissioner's injunction and remanded the matter to the chancellor
for "any proceedings necessary."3 In so doing, Justice Burnett pro-
vided guidelines for the resolution of the troublesome issue of handl-
ing trading stamps under the Dairy Act.
At issue is the appropriate economic characterization of trading
stamps under a "sale below cost" statute, a matter which has proven
difficult in other jurisdictions.4 The several state fair pricing statutes
have adopted different characterizations of trading stamps. One state
has expressly prohibited the giving of trading stamps under a fair
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 356 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1962).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-332 (Supp. 1961).
3. 356 S.W.2d at 271.
4. Arnot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1080 (1960); Note, 3 Anz. L. REv. 299 (1961); Note,
Trading Stamps, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1090, 1110 (1962); Note, 24 TENN. L. REv. 557
(1956); Note, Trading Stamps: A Challenge to Regulation of Price Competition, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 242 (1956). See also Clark, Statutory Restrictions on Selling Below
Cost, 11 VAND. L. REv. 105 (1957).
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trade statute;5 some seventeen others have forbidden the giving of
concessions, rebates, and coupons, without expressly referring to
trading stamps. 6 Two states have expressly provided that trading
stamps may be given without violating the fair trade statute.7 Judicial
treatment of trading stamps under these fair trade and unfair pricing
statutes has been no less divergent. Some courts have avoided the
problem either on a de minimis theory or by characterizing trading
stamps as equivalent to furnishing free parking or free delivery serv-
ice.8 Other courts have accepted the view, urged by the trading
stamp companies, that the giving of stamps represents a discount
given to the consumer in return for his prompt cash payment.9 Under
this view, the trading stamps are payment-related rather than cost-
related elements and are outside the statutory bar of (a fair trade
and) a "sales below cost statute" such as the Dairy Act.
Although no trend is apparent in other jurisdictions where the
courts have considered trading stamps under such statutes, some
courts have rejected the cash discount characterization."0 This view
recognizes that trading stamps are unlike a cash discount insofar as
the effective price reduction occurs, if at all, at a time much later
than payment, that is, when the trading stamps are redeemed." A
better characterization would take account of both the price-adjusting
and cost aspects of the trading stamp. The receipt of trading stamps
by the consumer may be viewed as a price concession sufficient to
induce the purchase at the time of purchase, while from the point of
5. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.15(2) (1957).
6. ALA. CODE tit. 57, § 79 (1958); CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 42-106 (1958);
DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1903 (1953); FI_. STAT. ANN. § 541.04 (1962); GA. CODE
ANN. § 106-405 (1953); HIwAn REv. LAws § 205-22 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
48-303 (1949); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 85-203 (1947); Omo REV. CODE § 1333.-
31(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1962); ORE. REV. STAT. § 646.360 (1955); S.D. CODE § 54.0403
(1939); VA. CODE ANN. § 59-4 (1950); W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 11, § 4678(3)
(1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.15(2) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-11 (1957).
7. Onto REv. CODE § 1333.32(A) (Baldwin Supp. 1962) (but limited to three per-
cent of the fair trade price); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59-4 (1950) and 59-8.4 (Supp. 1962).
8. Dart Drug Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 216 Md. 20, 139 A.2d 272 (1958); Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Kent, 287 Mich. 555, 283 N.W. 686 (1939); Gever v. American
Stores Co., 387 Pa. 206, 127 A.2d 694 (1956); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc.,
336 Pa. 81, 91, 6 A.2d 843, 848 (1939).
9. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n, 360 U.S. 334 (1959)
(dictum); Food & Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P.2d 3
(1942); Coming Glass Works v. Max Dichter Co., 102 N.H. 505, 161 A.2d 569
(1960); Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
10. Shuster & Co. v. Steffes, 237 Wis. 41, 295 N.W. 737 (1941) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute barring the giving of trading stamps on fair trade items);
see note 5 supra.
11. See generally Charvat, The Economics of Trading Stamps, 7 J. Pun. L. 450
(1958). An assessment of the validity of the thesis that fair trade and unfair price
statutes are either necessary or desirable is beyond the scope of this comment. See
generally REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATONAL Comimn-rEE To STUDY
THE ANUrrvsT LAws 149-55 (1955).
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view of the stamp-dispensing retailer, it is an item of cost. The
Tennessee Dairy Act takes account of both factors by providing that
among other cost items:
[The] cost of doing business of a retailer includes the fair value of any
concession of any kind whatever which has the effect of reducing the actual
sales price or increasing the cost of the goods delivered for the price stated
in the invoice, including but not limited to the cost to the retailer of trad-
ing stamps or redeemable coupons.' 2
In his opinion, Judge Burnett has rejected the cash discount charac-
terization and stressed the express statutory reference to trading
stamps as a cost element. Accordingly, this opinion stands for the
proposition that an injunction will not lie against a retailer who re-
duces his price by the cost of the trading stamps to his competitor
and can colorably claim a good faith meeting of competition.13
II. REFUSAL To TEST BY AN INDusTRY TESTING LABORATORY AS A
RESTRAINT OF TRADE UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
In Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co. the District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee by summary judgment dismissed
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-331(n) (Supp. 1961).
There is statistical evidence to validate this characterization of the trading stamp as
an added element of cost to the retailer. See UNrrD STATEs DEPARTmENr OF AGm-
CuLTURE, AGRICULTURAL MARKExING SERvicE, MARKET RESEARCH DIVISION REPORT No.
295, Trading Stamps and Their Impact on Food Prices, 17 (1958). Moreover, this study
suggests that the cost of the stamps, $2.25 per thousand on the average, is often passed
on to the consumer in the higher prices of the food sold. In a survey in 21 cities of 42
stamp and 53 non-stamp retail grocers from November, 1953, to March, 1957, the Market-
ing Research Division found that in two cities the average price increase in stamp stores
after the introduction of stamp programs, was at least 3% greater than the increase in
non-stamp stores. In eight cities, prices in the stores that added stamps showed price
declines in relation to their non-stamp competitors. In the remaining eleven cities,
prices in the stamp stores rose by not more than 2% in relation to stores not dispensing
stamps. Id. at 20.
A study conducted under the direction of Professor F. M. Westfield of the Depart-
ment of Economics and Business Administration at Vanderbilt University confirms
these findings. In four different areas of Nashville, a comparison of the items of a
standard market basket between similar and adjacent stamp and non-stamp markets
showed a sample mean difference for all items in the market basket of plus .015474
for the stamp-dispensing stores. A copy of this study is on file in the Vanderbilt Law
Library.
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-334(7) (Supp. 1961), provides for an exception from
the general bar against sales below the statutory price where: "the price of such items
is made in good faith to meet competition, provided that such prices shall not be cut
more than once, nor in any event cut below the price of competition."
The concept of a good faith meeting of competition has proven troublesome under
§ 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1958).
See RowE, PRicE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATmAN ACT 248-54 (1962)
for a discussion of the difficulties which the "good faith" defense has posed for federal
tribunals under § 2(b) of the Clayton Act.
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an action, under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which had alleged
unlawful concerted action between the defendant fire insurance
company and the industry testing laboratory manifested by the
latter's refusal to test the plaintiff's alarm device.14 In seeking an
injunction and a declaratory judgment of the duty of the Under-
writer's Laboratory to test and publish results, the plaintiff sought to
show a restraint of trade evidenced by the limitations on sales and on
access to advertising media which the absence of the testing labora-
tory's (Underwriters') seal imposed. The court appropriately dis-
missed plaintiff's complaint. Despite a substantial array of affidavits,
admissions, and depositions, no more than adherence by the testing
laboratory to its announced standards was shown.
The court based its disposition of this matter on the broad con-
struction of section 1 of the Sherman Act which bars only unreasona-
ble restraints of trade, citing the famous Standard Oil opinion of 1911.15
It is respectfully suggested that this complaint might have been more
appropriately dismissed on the narrower ground of the Radiant
Burners opinion which this court does not cite.16 In Radiant Burners
the Supreme Court announced a principle governing the adequacy of
a complaint to state a cause of action by refusal to test under section 1
of the Sherman Act. Within the meaning of the Radiant Burners
opinion, there are apparently two necessary and sufficient conditions
required to state a cause of action as a restraint of trade under section
1 of the Sherman Act. First, the effect of the refusal to test must in-
volve a restraint in the trade of a complementary product used with
the tested item. Second, the membership of the testing agency must
consist of some sellers competing with the plaintiff in the sale of the
device itself.17 Insofar as the present case did not contain allegations
14. 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
16. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
Here the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the appellant's
complaint alleging a violation of § 1 by its refusal as a testing agency to approve
gas burners and by the refusal of the testing association's membership to sell gas to
users of plaintiff's unapproved appliances. As the court viewed it, the allegation of a
conspiratorial refusal to furnish gas coupled with the presence among the member-
ship of the testing laboratory of competitors of plaintiff, was necessary to state a cause
of action under § 1. The court stated: "The conspiratorial refusal 'to provide gas for
use in the plaintiff's Radiant Burner[s] [because they] are not approved by AGA'
therefore falls within one of the 'classes of restraints which from their 'nature or
character' [are] unduly restrictive, and hence forbidden by . . . statute. . . .' The
alleged conspiratorial refusal to provide gas for use in plaintiff's Radiant Burners 'in-
terferes with the natural flow of interstate commerce. . . .' Therefore, to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under . . . [§ 1] allegations adequate to show a
violation ... are all the law requires." Id. at 659-60.
[Of the composition of the testing agency the court noted:] "Its tests are not based
on 'objective standards,' but are influenced by respondents, some of whom are in
competition with petitioner." Id. at 658.
17. See note 18 infra.
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sufficient to meet this test, the complaint might have been dismissed
by reference to the Radiant Burners opinion rather than the wider
"rule of reason" test of section 1. That the broader doctrinal ground
of the rule of reason may serve to embolden other plaintiffs to bring
such an action is suggested by the history of this very case.'8
III. PRICE FIXING UNDER SECTION 1-ATTEMPTs To MONOPOLIZE,
COMBINATIONS OR CONSPIRACIEs To MONOPOLIZE, AND MONOPOLIZATION
UNDER SECTION 2--DIscRIMINATORY PRICING UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
In Volasco Products v. Fry, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit considered on cross-appeals three consolidated treble damage
actions arising from pricing and other practices in the sale of roofing
materials within a relevant market area defined by a radius of 200
miles around the city of Knoxville.' 9 The plaintiffs, two affiliated, ver-
tically-integrated corporations engaged in the manufacture of asphalt
and asphalt roofing materials, had made three allegations involving
the defendant corporation which at the time of action was the largest
manufacturer of asphalt roofing products in the United States. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had: (1) conspired with other
sellers to fix prices in the relevant market; (2) monopolized or had
attempted to monopolize the sale of asphalt roofing products; and
(3) pursued a policy of discriminating in price between purchasers
of roofing products in the market area. On the trial, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of plaintiff Volasco, the roofing manufacturer, and
awarded damages which the district judge duly trebled; from this
judgment and from the injunction against further violations, the
defendant appealed. The district judge had dismissed the claim of
Volunteer, the integrated asphalt manufacturer; from this judgment,
plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of Volunteer's claim, but reversed the judgment for
damages to Volasco and remanded the case to the district court for
a new trial. The basis for reversal was twofold: (1) the insufficiency
of the evidence of monopoly, under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
coupled with an erroneous instruction to the jury relating to this
18. This same plaintiff had sought a declaratory judgment in an earlier suit, of the
testing agency's right to refuse testing as an arbitrary and tortious denial. The testing
laboratory justified its refusal to test this device by its established rule that any device
offered for testing and approval must sound a continuous warning for at least three
minutes at full intensity. The offered device gave only an instantaneous warning in
the form of a single loud report. The district court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment, noting the clear failure of the plaintiff to meet reasonable
standards set by the testing laboratory. See Roofire Alarm Co. v. Underwriters' Lab.,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 753, 754 (E.D. Tenn. 1959), aff'd, 284 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1960).
19. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 30& F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).
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section; and (2) failure to use the proper measure of damages under
section 1. On its review of the record in this case, the appellate court
found that the evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury on
the conspiracy to fix prices and that the trial judge's instruction to the
jury was correct on that issue.20 The grounds for reversal were the
errors relating to section 2 and the fallacious method of computing
damages. By refusing to apply the so-called two issue rule, the
court considered itself bound to reverse the judgment in toto.
It is respectfully suggested that the complete reversal of the judg-
ment on both the section 1 and section 2 branches of the case is
neither desirable nor required. As a proposition of substantive law,
section 2 of the Sherman Act is recognized as being violated by con-
duct and circumstances independent of acts which will violate section
1, although conduct illegal under section 1 is among the classes of
illegal conduct which may violate section 2. As this relationship be-
tween section 2 and section 1 has been characterized:
Situations of monopoly [under section 2] may arise or be maintained in
various ways. . . . Monopoly may develop . . . from the absorption of
competitors in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, or Section 1 of the
Sherman Act or both. Or monopoly can emerge and be preserved by driving
competitors out of business, by putting deliberate business impediments in
their path, or by combining or conspiring with competitors . . . .21
Thus, as a matter of substantive law, a section 1 violation may also
constitute a violation of section 2, but the relationship is not reversi-
ble. A violation of section 1 by fixing prices does not take any of its
illegality from section 2. Indeed, a long line of Supreme Court
opinions has underscored the independent (and illegal) nature of
price-fixing under section 1 by characterizing price-fixing as illegal
per se under the first section of the Sherman Act.'
Given this independent substantive relationship between the two
statutory provisions it seems perverse to allow the deficiencies in the
section 2 branch of the case to be combined with the error in the
computation of damages, and thus to undercut a verdict based upon a
clear showing of price-fixing. It would have been better to remand
this case for a proper computation of damages, without disturbing the
judgment on the section 1 violation.
20. Id. at 389.
21. REPORT OF THIE ATTORNEo Y GENERAL'S CoMMnTTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 55-56 (1955).
22. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); United States v. Socony Vacuum
Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S: 290-(1897).
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